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WHEN A HOTEL IS YOUR HOME, IS THERE
PROTECTION? - Baker v. Rushing
INTRODUCTION
Property law, specifically as it relates to the residential land-
lord-tenant relationship, has undergone significant reform over the
past twenty years.1 Necessarily, to receive the benefits of this re-
form, the occupant must establish that he or she is a tenant and
has not attained the status of some other type of occupant, such as
a guest or lodger.2 Difficulty arises when the line distinguishing the
class of establishment (e.g. hotel, boarding house, apartment) blurs
and, thus, the legal status of the parties becomes an issue.3 In this
situation one factor is not dispositive, rather, various factors are
weighed against each other to determine the nature of the parties'
relationship."
The North Carolina Court of Appeals adopted this approach
in Baker v. Rushing.5 The court held that occupants of a putative
hotel may be residential tenants.' By looking at the "totality of the
circumstances, ' 7 the court determined these circumstances might
entitle plaintiffs to assert claims under North Carolina's Residen-
tial Rental Agreements Act ("RRA") and Article 2A, Chapter 42,
"Ejectment of Residential Tenants." Thus, the decision reflects
1. See generally Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord
Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNMLL L. REV. 517 (1984).
2. The author does not attempt to distinguish between the terms "guest" and
"lodger." To clarify the distinction, see Comment, Tenant, Lodger, and Guest:
Questionable Categories for Modern Rental Occupants, 64 YALE L.J. 391 (1955);
40 AM. JUR. 2D Hotels, Motels, and Restaurants § 14 (1968).
3. 49 AM. Jui. 2D Landlord'and Tenant § 6 (1970).
4. Id.
5. 104 N.C. App. 240, 409 S.E.2d 108 (1991).
6. Id. at 247, 409 S.E.2d at 112. The court also held summary judgment
against fewer than all defendants was immediately appealable. See infra note 15.
Furthermore, the court deemed the lower court had improperly granted summary
judgment for defendants on defendant Claude Steven Mosley's status as a land-
lord and on defendants The Franklin Apartments of Monroe's and The Franklin
Hotel, Inc.'s liability terminating upon their respective dissolutions. Baker,, 104
N.C. App. at 249-50, 409 S.E.2d at 113-14.
7. Tenant Status Given to Hotel 'Guests,' N.C. LAw. WKLY., Oct. 21, 1991, at
1,4.
8. Baker, 104 N.C. App. at 247, 409 S.E.2d at 112.
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the necessity of regarding substance over form.
First, this Note will provide a brief history of landlord-tenant
law, tracing the common law through the development of pro-ten-
ant reforms. Then, this Note examines the distinction between a
tenant and a guest and the legal consequences of that distinction.
This Note also discusses the rationale behind the Baker decision
and its legal implication. This Note concludes with suggestions of
the broader ramifications of Baker.
THE CASE
Plaintiffs were fifteen occupants of defendant The Franklin
Hotel.' Pursuant to an oral lease, each plaintiff maintained an
apartment in the hotel as his or her sole residence and made
weekly "rent" payments. 10 Despite plaintiffs' repeated requests,
defendants failed to make necessary repairs to correct the numer-
ous defects in the premises.11 Approximately eleven months after
The Franklin Hotel obtained a hotel license, defendant Claude
Steven Mosley instructed the building manager to inform plaintiffs
the building would close the following month.12 Subsequently,
plaintiffs were evicted without judicial process."
Plaintiffs commenced this action, alleging breach of the im-
plied warranty of habitability, breach of the covenant of quiet en-
joyment, unfair or deceptive trade practices, unfair debt collection
practices, trespass, trespass to chattels, and conversion. 14 The trial
court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants15 on the
basis of plaintiffs' status as transient occupants."6 On appeal,
plaintiffs argued their status as residential tenants, while defend-
9. Id. at 243, 409 S.E.2d at 110.
10. Id. at 247, 409 S.E.2d at 112.
11. Id. at 243, 409 S.E.2d at 110. Defects included intermittent supply of hot
water, leaking ceilings, missing windows, rodent infestation, defective plumbing,
and trash accumulation in common areas. Id.
12. Id. at 244, 409 S.E.2d at 110.
13. Id. In fact, plaintiffs' eviction occurred two days before Christmas and in
violation of a temporary restraining order. Id.
14. Id. at 243, 409 S.E.2d at 110.
15. The court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants Mosley, The
Franklin Apartments of Monroe, and The Franklin Hotel, Inc. The action against
Leroy Rushing and Rushing Construction Co. was pending. The court deemed
appropriate immediate appeal from the interlocutory order. Id. at 245-46, 409
S.E.2d at 111.
16. Id. at 246, 409 S.E.2d at 112. Also, the trial court entered summary judg-
ment on other grounds. See supra note 6.
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ants alleged plaintiffs could not achieve this status due to the
building's identification as a "hotel.' 17 The court of appeals re-
jected defendants' argument, holding that although premises may
be referred to as a hotel, occupants may be deemed residential
tenants.18
BACKGROUND
Under the common law, the doctrine of caveat emptor ap-
plied; the landlord had no obligation to render the premises habit-
able.19 Although this rule is appropriate for an agrarian society in
which tenants place great value on the land itself and can make
repairs themselves, modern tenants value the actual accommoda-
tions over the land.2 0 These tenants want more than an interest in
land; they expect a habitable place with adequate electricity,
plumbing, and maintenance. 1 Thus, retaining the common law in
contemporary society afforded landlords significant protection, at
the expense of tenants.2 2
To alleviate the harshness of caveat emptor, exceptions to the
doctrine developed.2  Limited exceptions, such as the landlord's
duty to disclose known, latent defects, provided little assistance to
the typical tenant who held a long-term lease on the premises. 24
Another tenant benefit, the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment,
entitled the lessee to quiet and peaceable possession of the prem-
ises.2 5 This covenant protects the lessee "against the wrongful acts
17. Id.
18. Id. at 247, 409 S.E.2d at 112.
19. 1 HERBERT T. TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 86 (1912) ("[Tlhere is,
apart from fraud, no law against letting a tumble-down house."). See also Robin-
son v. Thomas, 244 N.C. 732, 94 S.E.2d 911 (1956).
20. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074, 1077 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
21. ROBERT S. SCHOSHINsIu, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 3:14
(1980).
22. See JANICE L. MILs, NORTH CAROLINA LANDLORD AND TENANT BREACH
AND REMEDIES WITH FORMS § 1-1 (1991).
23. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.36 (1984).
24. Jean C. Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat
Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 19, 50 (1975). Other
exceptions included liability for defects on premises leased for admission of the
public, an implied warranty of habitability in short-term leases of furnished
premises, breach of a covenant to repair, negligent repair, defects in common ar-
eas, and housing codes. Id.
25. Andrews & Knowles Produce Co. v. Currin, 243 N.C. 131, 135, 90 S.E.2d
1993] 297
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of the lessor, someone claiming under the lessor, or one who has a
title paramount to the title of the lessor. '2 6 These remedies were
not sufficient to protect tenants' rights.
Not surprisingly, a housing revolution occurred during the late
sixties and early seventies, primarily in response to societal
changes. 7 The landmark decision of Javins v. First National Re-
alty Corp. determined every lease of a dwelling unit covered by the
applicable housing code contains an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity.2 8 The court recognized the inequality in the tenant's bargain-
ing power based on discrimination, standardized form leases, and a
shortage of adequate housing. The court based its holding upon
the modern trend to interpret leases according to contract law, as
opposed to traditional property law which is not well-suited to ur-
ban society.30
Four years after the Javins decision, with Hartley v. Ballou,31
North Carolina began its move away from the common law by rec-
ognizing an implied warranty of habitability in the construction of
new homes.82 In 1977, the legislature extended this rule by enact-
ing North Carolina's first "consumer-oriented" real property legis-
lation: the RRA.3 The RRA implicitly provides an implied war-
228, 230 (1955); Dobbins v. Paul, 71 N.C. App. 113, 117, 321 S.E.2d 537, 541
(1984).
26. JAMEs A. WEBSTER, JR., WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA
§ 238 (Patrick K. Hetrick & James B. McLaughlin, Jr. eds., 3d ed. 1988).
27. See generally Rabin, supra note 1. Rabin attributes the housing revolu-
tion to the civil rights movement, economic prosperity, resistance to the Vietnam
War, and legal precedents. Id. at 540-44.
28. 428 F.2d 1071, 1072-73 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
29. Id. at 1079.
30. Id. at 1074-75.
31. 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974).
32. Theodore 0. Fillette, III, North Carolina's Residential Rental Agree-
ments Act: New Developments for Contract and Tort Liability in Landlord-Ten-
ant Relations, 56 N.C. L. REv. 785, 786 (1978). Coincidentally, the author of this
article represented the plaintiffs in Baker for Legal Services of Southern Pied-
mont, Inc. Baker, 104 N.C. App. at 242, 409 S.E.2d at 109.
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-38 to -49 (1984 & Supp. 1991); see Fillette, supra
note 32, at 806. The landlord has the following obligations:
(1) [to] comply with the current applicable building and housing codes
(2) [to] make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to keep the prem-
ises-in a fit and habitable condition;
(3) (to] keep all common areas of the premises in safe condition; and
(4) [to] maintain in good and safe working order and promptly repair all
298 [Vol. 15:295
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ranty of habitability in residential leases.34 Landlords now have a
duty to repair and a violation of this duty is evidence of
negligence.35
The RRA delineates, among other things, the rights of persons
who occupy a "facilit[y] normally held out for the use of residen-
tial tenants who are using the dwelling unit as their primary resi-
dence."38 Consequently, transient occupants of hotels or motels do
not receive protection of the RRA. 7 Unlike these transient occu-
pants, residential tenants may only be evicted pursuant to sum-
mary ejectment proceedings; 8 a court in such a proceeding has ju-
risdiction only where a landlord-tenant relationship exists.3 9
Formerly, under Spinks v. Taylor,40 landlords had the option
of peaceable self-help eviction and did not have to resort to judi-
cial process. 41 Eviction is peaceful so long as the tenant does not
object.42 Self-help includes padlocking and interruption of utilities
or water service.43 Not satisfied with the Spinks decision, the legis-
lature enacted Article 2A of Chapter 42, "Ejectment of Residential
electrical, plumbing, sanitary ... facilities ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42(a) (1984). For an interesting view of the plight of repre-
senting the low-income tenant prior to the enactment of the RRA, see Dale A.
Whitman, Defending the Low-Income Tenant in North Carolina, 2 N.C. CENT.
L.J. 21 (1970).
34. See Surratt v. Newton, 99 N.C. App. 396, 403-04, 393 S.E.2d 554, 558
(1990). For a discussion of remedies available to tenant for breach, see Mark A.
Stafford, Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1987, Miller v. C.W.
Myers Trading Post: North Carolina Adopts Expansive Tenant Remedies for Vi-
olations of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 66 N.C. L. REv. 1276 (1988);
Johnny Foster, Note, A Fresh Look at Contractual Tenant Remedies Under the
North Carolina Residential Rental Agreements Act- Miller v. C.W. Myers Trad-
ing Post, Inc., 10 CAMPBELL L. REv. 167 (1987).
35. Brooks v. Francis, 57 N.C. App. 556, 559, 291 S.E.2d 889, 890-91 (1982).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-40(2) (1984).
37. See id. § 42-39(a).
38. See id. § 42-25.6. Liability is as follows:
If any lessor, landlord, or agent removes or attempts to remove a tenant
from a dwelling unit in any manner contrary to this Article, the tenant
shall be entitled to recover possession or to terminate his lease and the
lessor, landlord or agent shall be liable to the tenant for damages caused
by the tenant's removal or attempted removal.
Id. § 42-25.9(a) (Supp. 1991).
39. Hayes v. Turner, 98 N.C. App. 451, 454, 391 S.E.2d 513, 515 (1990).
40. 303 N.C. 256, 278 S.E.2d 501 (1981).
41. See id. at 262, 278 S.E.2d at 504.
42. Id. at 263, 278 S.E.2d at 505.
43. Rabin, supra note 1, at 538.
1993] 299
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Tenants." This article prohibits landlord self-help in residential
tenancies.4" Arguably, in the absence of a residential landlord-ten-
ant relationship, peaceable self-help remains as an alternative to
evict occupants.
The applicability of both the RRA and the right to summary
ejectment proceedings depend upon the occupant's status as a resi-
dential tenant.48 In order for a landlord-tenant relationship to ex-
ist, the landlord must transfer the right to possession of the prem-
ises. Transfer of the right to possession occurs when the occupant
has "control over and the power to exclude others from the prop-
erty. 4 8 Various factors examined in determining whether the
owner transferred this right include the description of the prop-
erty, any limitations on the occupant's use of the premises, and
terms used surrounding the transaction.49
In contrast to transferring to the tenant the right to exclusive
possession, the owner might retain control over the property and
only give the occupant the right to use the premises.8 0 This situa-
tion creates a licensor-licensee relationship and occurs in the case
of transient occupancies."' The North Carolina Supreme Court de-
fines a hotel guest as a "transient person who resorts to and is re-
ceived at an inn for the purpose of obtaining the accommodations
which it purports to afford."52 As a transient person, a hotel guest
is within the classification of licensees. 53 The guest acquires no in-
terest in land5" and, thus, courts are less willing to afford a guest
the same protection as a tenant.55
44. WEBSTER, supra note 26, § 72.1 n.76. For a discussion of the evolution of
the self-help eviction doctrine, the provisions of Chapter 42 and its probable im-
pact, see Robert S. Thompson, Comment, Landlord Eviction Remedies Act- Leg-
islative Overreaction to Landlord Self-Help, 18 WAKE FOREsT L. REV. 25 (1982).
45. Kathleen P. Southern, Note, Spinks v. Taylor and G.S. 42-26: Abolition
of Self-Help Evictions in North Carolina, 60 N.C. L. Rev. 885 (1982).
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-25.6, -40(2) (1984).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, § 1.2 (1977); SCHOSHINSKI, supra
note 21, § 1.3.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, supra note 47, § 1.2 cmt. a.
49. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 21, § 1.3.
50. Comment, supra note 2, at 392.
51. See id.
52. Holstein v. Phillips & Sims, 146 N.C. 366, 371, 59 S.E. 1037, 1039 (1907).
53. WEBSTER, supra note 26, § 344; 49 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 3, § 6;
SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 21, § 1.5. See also Hutchins v. Durham, 118 N.C. 457,
471, 24 S.E. 723, 728 (1896).
54. 49 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 3, § 6; 1 TIFFANY, supra note 19, § 8.
55. Comment, supra note 2, at 402.
[Vol. 15:295
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If the hotel as the owner and licensor has retained control of
the premises, the license granted to the guest may be freely re-
voked.56 The owner often evinces control by: retaining the room
key, providing maid services, sharing facilities with the occupant,
repairing and maintaining rooms, supplying furniture and other
furnishings, and providing utilities. 5 Rather than consider one fac-
tor dispositive in classifying an occupant's status, courts generally
focus on all the facts of the case. 8 Even when the occupant agrees
to pay the owner what is called "rent," the use of this term does
not conclusively establish the existence of a landlord-tenant rela-
tionship.59 Although the distinction between a tenant and a guest
under the RRA is one of first impression in North Carolina, other
jurisdictions have adopted the rationale set forth above and classi-
fied occupants as tenants when the facts indicate the hotel has re-
linquished control over the premises.60 The importance of the dis-
tinction between a tenant and a guest revolves around the legal
consequences of the relationship created. 1 The RRA protects only
residential tenants.62 Also, summary ejectment proceedings are the
exclusive remedy for landlords who seek to evict residential te-
56. WEBSTER, supra note 26, § 344.
57. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 21, § 1.5.
58. CUNNNGHAM BT AL., supra note 23, § 6.6. See also Comment, supra note
2, at 410-11.
59. 1 TIFFANY, supra note 19, § 7.
60. See, e.g., Williams v. Alexander Hamilton Hotel, 592 A.2d 644 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (occupants lived at hotel over two years, used their
own linens, did not receive maid service, registered to vote at the hotel's address,
and intended to remain indefinitely); Serreze v. YMCA of Western Mass., Inc.,
572 N.E.2d 581 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (residents of transitional living program
who paid monthly rent entitled to protection of statute prohibiting self-help evic-
tion); Chawla v. Horch, 333 N.Y.S.2d 531 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972) (written lease for
eleven month period, maid service provided, occupants paid rent on monthly ba-
sis); Hundley v. Milner Hotel Management Co., 114 F. Supp. 206 (W.D. Ky. 1953)
(maid service not provided, unfurnished room, paid monthly, occupant lived on
premises a number of years), aff'd, 216 F.2d 613 (6th Cir. 1954); Lambert v. Sine,
256 P.2d 241 (Utah 1953) (owner insisted occupants remain for period longer than
a usual traveler would, rent paid in advance); Brin v. Sidenstucker, 8 N.W.2d 423
(Iowa 1943) (paid "rent," unfurnished room, building called "hotel"). Compare
Sawyer v. Congress Square Hotel Co., 170 A.2d 645 (Me. 1961) (occupant classi-
fied as guest: owner furnished room, bed linens, maid service, and utilities, and
retained keys to the room).
61. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 21, § 1.4.
62. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
19931
7
Campbell: When a Hotel Is Your Home, Is There Protection? - Baker v. Rushin
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1993
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
nants.6 3 Unlike other occupants," tenants under periodic tenancies
are entitled to statutory notice to quit.6 5 Quite clearly, none of
these statutory forms of protection are available to a hotel guest.
Although the RRA and the right to summary ejectment do not
protect all types of occupants, hotel guests are not without rights.66
Under the common law, guests receive significantly more protec-
tion than tenants. The innkeeper has a duty to maintain the
premises in reasonably safe condition and warn a guest of hidden
dangers.66 Also, if wrongfully evicted, although he or she cannot
recover possession in an ejectment proceeding, the guest may
maintain an action for damages.6 9 Yet, with the statutory pro-ten-
ant reform, tenants' rights are more clearly delineated than the
rights of guests.7 0 Therefore, an occupant would most likely prefer
the status of a tenant, particularly with respect to actions for
breach of the implied warranty of habitability and wrongful
eviction.
ANALYSIS
In Baker, the North Carolina courts had the first opportunity
to address the issue of whether an occupant of a hotel may meet
the definition of residential tenant as contained in Chapter 42,
"Landlord and Tenant." An unanimous court of appeals held that
genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on
the basis of plaintiffs' status as tenants.71 The court placed great
weight on the fact that plaintiffs leased the premises as primary
residences along with other factors tending to indicate the exis-
tence of a landlord-tenant relationship.7 2
63. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
64. See Robbins v. Reagan, 616 F. Supp. 1259 (D.D.C.) (occupants of home-
less shelter), aff'd in part, 780 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Sawyer, 170 A.2d at 645
,(hotel guest).
65. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-14 (Supp. 1991).
66. N.C. GEN STAT. § 72-1 (1985) provides: "Every innkeeper shall at all
times provide suitable lodging accommodations for all persons accepted as guests
in his inn or hotel."
67. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 n.33 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
68. Page v. Sloan, 281 N.C. 697, 702, 190 S.E.2d 189, 192 (1972). See gener-
ally 40 AM. JuR. 2D, supra note 2, §§ 81-110.
69. Hutchins v. Durham, 118 N.C. 457, 468, 24 S.E. 723, 727 (1896).
70. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-28 to -49 (1984 & Supp. 1991).
71. Baker v. Rushing, 104 N.C. App. 240, 247, 409 S.E.2d 108, 112 (1991).
72. See Id.
302 [Vol. 15:295
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Rather than focus on the building's classification as a hotel,
the court of appeals appropriately considered all of the circum-
stances surrounding the transaction. Each apartment consisted of
one or two bedrooms and separate kitchen/living rooms and
baths.7 3 Plaintiffs maintained no other residences outside of The
Franklin Hotel. 4 Furthermore, the duration of some occupancies
had lasted as long as six years.7 The parties described the weekly
payments as "rent."'7 6 Although defendant Mosley had obtained a
hotel license for the building, the building continued to operate in
virtually the same manner as before the designation." These fac-
tors indicate the hotel was a facility held out for the use of the
plaintiffs as their primary residence78 as opposed to an establish-
ment which receives transient persons for compensation.79 Appar-
ently, the court viewed the building not as a hotel in the true sense
of the word, rather, as analogous to an apartment building. The
factors in the case indicate The Franklin Hotel had relinquished
control and transferred exclusive possession to plaintiffs, and, thus,
in the absence of the statutory definition of residential tenant, the
court likely would have reached the same result.
The Baker decision is not surprising based on the historical
development in landlord-tenant law towards protecting tenants.
The court of appeals did not drastically alter tenants' rights; the
holding merely clarifies who constitutes a residential tenant.
The implication of the decision is clear: landlords cannot cir-
cumvent the purposes behind the RRA and summary ejectment by
labeling a building a "hotel." Residential tenants are entitled to fit
and habitable living conditions. 80 And, "in order to maintain the
public peace," a landlord may only evict a residential tenant
through judicial process.81 The legislature could not have envi-
sioned a landlord successfully eradicating these basic tenant rights
73. Id. at 247, 409 S.E.2d at 112.
74. Id. at 243, 409 S.E.2d at 110.
75. Id. at 247, 409 S.E.2d at 112.
76. Id. at 243, 409 S.E.2d at 110.
77. Id. at 247, 409 S.E.2d at 112. Yet, interestingly, the practice of using
summary ejectment to evict tenants did cease upon hotel licensure. Id. at 244,
409 S.E.2d at 110.
78. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-40 (1984).
79. See Holstein v. Phillips & Sims, 146 N.C. 366, 370, 59 S.E. 1037, 1039
(1907).
80. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42 (1984).
81. See Id. § 42-25.6.
1993] 303
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based on the technical distinction of the premises.
CONCLUSION
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Baker examined the
applicability of the Residential Rental Agreements Act and the
Ejectment of Residential Tenants Act as they pertain to persons
who permanently reside in a hotel. The court held that occupants
of a hotel may be residential tenants for purposes of these acts.
This holding extends significant protection to "hotel" residents, af-
fording them habitable housing and the right to statutory notice
and judicial process prior to eviction. The short-run benefit is a
blessing to the low-income tenant who frequently resides in this
substandard type of housing. Yet, what of the long run? Might
these obligations discourage a landlord from providing low-income
housing? Now, landlords will have to expend sums to bring the ac-
commodations up to the RRA standard and to bring an action in
summary ejectment. The cost of rent will increase to offset the in-
crease in expenditures, thereby forcing out the low-income tenant.
Such a result runs counter to the ultimate goal of pro-tenant re-
form: the provision of habitable and affordable housing for all.
Widespread withdrawal from the "hotel-housing" market may or
may not occur, as only the future will tell the ultimate impact of
this holding.
Amy M. Campbell
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